傅柯（Michel Foucault）晚期著作經常被批判為自戀式的倫理個人主義，忽略了自我與他者之社會關係在自我構成、自我創造中扮演之關鍵角色。論者並批判認為其存在美學之立場與決斷主義緊密相連，而成為一種美學決斷主義。本文嘗試批判這些論點，並指出傅柯不曾漠視自我形成過程中與他者之互動關係此一重要面向。反之，傅柯倫理學中對於他者之關注或自我與他者之關係即蘊含於關注自我而呈現一體兩面。不僅如此，倫理學中並抱持美學以外之一定的價值立場，他明白指出最低限度宰制係倫理關懷之關鍵要務；對於不均衡、不可逆轉之宰制關係作出「真正難以忍受」的評價。從另一角度言之，這意味傅柯強調自我與他者之關係至少必須是可逆轉之頡頏關係：「一種同時相互激發與鬥爭的關係」。

Some critics tend to interprete later Foucault as some sort of proponent of anonymous individuality or narcissism. An awareness of the formation of the self through social interaction is absent from Foucault's later work. It has been argued also that the primacy of aestheticist implications translates into a normative stance in which descisionistic tendencies gain the upper hand. This paper tries to criticize such interpretations and argues that Foucault does not neglect the importance of the self's relations with others in the constitution of the self. Further, Foucault also recognizes that the relation between subjects needs to take the form of a reciprocity adapted, in light of the universiality of power, into a form of ＂agonism＂: the relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle.