本論文試圖藉由探討西田幾多郎（1870-1945）的人格論，來反駁批判佛教對其哲學的批判性觀點。批判佛教認為京都學派為一種場所佛教，並將西田的場所邏輯解釋為現代版的「起信論」體系。其他與批判佛教無關的學者，亦支持此觀點並採用它，所以此種解釋極為重要。本文欲探求的是，後期西田排斥此種解釋的可能性。初期的場所邏輯雖然難免會被人誤認為唯心一元論，但後期西田透過自我與人格的探討後，卻轉而開始反對像「起信論」這種（批判佛教所批評的）形上學體系。為了突顯此思想脈絡，本文將比較後期西田哲學與牟宗三（1909-1995）的圓教論，藉以闡明兩人的人格概念如何不同於「起信論」式的形上學體系。

Abstract This paper attempts to interpret the theory of personhood in the works of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in a way that refutes a certain type of Nishida interpretation that Critical Buddhism offers. According to this type of interpretation, the logic of basho is a modern version of the Qixinlun system. Based on this interpretation, Critical Buddhism denounces Kyoto School philosophy as ＂topical Buddhism.＂ This paper shows how Nishida himself consciously differentiates his philosophy from the idealistic and monistic system with which the earlier version of the logic of basho can easily be confused. To show that his theory of personhood opposes the Qixinlun-like system, I argue that Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Tiantai theory of personhood is analogous to Nishida's and explore the common nature of their philosophies.