宋明儒的「詮釋學教法」有「存有論」與「認識論－方法論」兩條路線。伊川朱子兼有兩者（以認識論作為存有論的前提），象山陽明則是強化存有論而弱化認識論。詮釋學的存有論以啟發、涵養詮釋者的道德存有為己任，程朱即是這這樣的思路。陸王則是化被動為主動，以詮釋者的本心良知籠罩、取消文本的意義曲折。這是倫理學的「先驗之理」統治「經驗情境」的詮釋學版本。不管是倫理實踐還是經典詮釋，陽明的良知教法遵循的都是象山路線。在經典詮釋方面，他不像象山那樣極富創造性地提出「六經皆我註腳」、「我註六經、六經註我」等詮釋原則，但陽明也有自己的提法，「記籍說」、「吾心之常道說」與「天理人欲說」都是典型命題。情境知識的問題被他收攝到本心之中，文義文脈的認知要求也被他的良知之天理所淡化。他比象山意識得更多，所以其心學的反擊力道與影響性也更強。經典詮釋是一枚試劑，測試的是儒者在道德實踐的任務中，如何看待先聖前賢的「言說」。

As it has evolves in Song-Ming Confucianism, ‘the teaching of interpretation’ can at least be divided into two distinct models, that are ontology and epistemology. Cheng Yi and his successor Zhu Xi try to construct a program that the ontology must inseparably be connected with the epistemology (epistemology is the condition of ontology). But for Wang Yangming and his predecessor Lu Jiuyuan, which argue strongly against the importance of ‘knowledge’ in moral field, claim the accurate representation of ‘meaning’ of classics is not absolutely necessary in ‘the event of interpretation.’ Both of them set aside epistemology and are in agreement that the ontological inspiration and cultivation of moral beings must be seen as core ideas. Its hermeneutical consequence is that the subject gets rid of the contexts of the texts. ‘Account books,’ ‘my mind/heart is eternal Dao’ and ‘the principle of heaven vs. human desire’ are Wang’s typical issues. For Wang, the point of ‘interpretation’ is to keep the conscience (liangzhi) further proving itself rather than to find objective meanings of the classics.