Interpretation Shih No. 577 evolved from the dissenting opinion of a previous one (Shih No. 414). Shih No. 577's proposition is that commercial speech merits constitutional safeguard as other types of speech do. While it does not provide a thorough, definitive description to describe what speech or commercial speech is under the umbrella of Art. 11 of the R.O.C. Constitution, Shih No. 577 for the first time stated that under Art. 11, speech encompasses“expressions of subjective opinions” and “statements of objective facts,” two distinctly categorical concepts that cannot be neglected when labeling regulations on tobacco products are under judicial review. To be more specific, in terms of labeling regulations on tobacco products, requirements of ingredients are more about statements of objective facts, and health warnings more about expressions of subjective opinions. Shih No. 577 reviews regulatory requirements on cigarette-ingredients labeling instead of compulsory government health warnings; under its review are the ingredients indications by the tobacco companies, not health warnings from the government. Shih No. 577 takes the position that there are many reasons for constitutional protections extended to commercial speech. Requirements of cigarette-ingredients labeling involve more of constitutional values on the free flow of information, but is not irrelevant to the values of self-realization or the formation process of opinions through commercial speech. Shih No. 577 places its focus on the constitutionality of regulatory restrictions on the right not to speak. The requirements on ingredients compel disclosure of factual information, constrain upon one's free will of not providing information, and trigger judicial review. As to government health-warning requirements that place restrictions upon the freedom not to disseminate others' opinions, it is not a subject for Shih No. 577. This interpretation employs the principle of proportionality to complete the exercise of judicial review. A four-part analysis was explored in detail to an extent that was never shown by the Grand Justices before. Although Grand Justice H.M. Yu observed that the majority was conducting intermediary scrutiny, the author presents at least three different points to argue that the majority is inc1ined to strict scrutiny for offering better protection on the freedom of speech.