The mentalistic interpretation of Confucius's concept of ”ren” (benevolence) provided by the school of Zi-si and Mencius is a great development of Confucianism. In terms of their metaphysical readings, the Song-Ming Confucians and the contemporary Confucians claim that they are the true successors of the Pre-Qin Confucianism. However, I think that the moral thinking of Confucius does not necessarily have the presuppositions in the metaphysical theory of mind and nature as recognized by the later Confucians. And the mentalistic theory of mind and nature provided by the school of Zi-si and Mencius is not necessarily and appropriately incorporated into the onto-cosmology of the later Confucians. Herbert Fingarette provides a new and non-psychological interpretation of the Analects that is not only radically different from the traditional one but also controversial in regard to the issue whether some key terms in Confucius's moral philosophy have reference to mental content. He rejects to treat ren as a mental concept which is based on the inner-outer or internal-external distinction. Based on John Austin's theory of speech acts and Gibert Ryle's logical behaviorism, he provides a new interpretation of Confucius's thought in the Analects. He argues that all psychological interpretations do not provide a correct reading of the Analects. In this paper I want to provide some counter examples to demonstrate what is wrong both in the reading of the later Confucians and in that of Fingarette. I try to put the relation of ren and li into a framework of intentionality and intentional action and provide a new interpretation which is beyond the above two existent interpretations.