本文探討公元2008年國民黨重新執政後「一致政府」時期，行政院與立法院在立法上的相對影響力。過去的相關研究多集中在「一致政府」與「分立政府」「之間」的比較，本文焦點則在於「一致政府」「內部」的層次，並且將行政和立法機關的立法影響力，置於我國半總統制憲政架構的理論來探討。本研究藉由三個層面來檢視行政院和立法院在四個會期中關於立法的影響力，分別是所有法案、重要法案以及多版本法案。研究結果發現，行政院在法案的通過上多數時候較立法委員較具主導性的影響力，但各會期都有高比例的重大法案推動不順利，這亦顯示在一致政府下，國民黨雖然同時掌握行政和立法部門的多數，但半總統制分權特性下立法委員相對於行政部門在立法上有一定程度的自主性，也會削弱行政權的立法強度。

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of the executive branch in the process of lawmaking compared with the legislative branch in Taiwan, since Kuomintang (KMT) has became the ruling party and unified government took place again in 2008. Previous studies mainly deal with the comparison between the unified government and divided government; however this study focuses on the internal operation of unified government and put the test of relative influence of the executive branch and the legislative branch under the structure of Taiwan's semi-presidentialism. Base upon three dimensions of lawmaking, including all bills, crucial bills and multi-proposal bills, the author tries to test the relative influence of the executive branch and the legislative branch. The key finding is that at most time the relative influence of the Executive Yuan is higher than the Legislative Yuan. However, during each legislative session, there are high proportions of crucial bills not passed. So, I argue that the KMT's legislators have their autonomy in the process of lawmaking under the structure of semi-presidentialism, even though the ruling party controlled the majority seats of the legislature.