人類思想史上，凡是有善人得福、惡人受罰的教義或理論，總會產生此一理論與實際不相符的問題。這問題在西方被稱為「神義論問題」，在中國稱為「報施多爽」。西方漢學界自韋伯（Max Weber）以後，普遍認為中國傳統幾乎不存在這一問題。本文揭示，「報施多爽」的問題不僅在中國思想史上廣泛地存在，而且是漢魏六朝時的思想家（包括儒、釋、道）所關注的一個大問題。他們對此進行了深入的討論和論辯。本文認為，報施多爽的問題的產生與道德定命論的建立有關，而道德定命論在儒、釋、道三家的理論中都存在， 漢魏六朝思想界對「報施多爽」問題的討論是韋伯所說的「理性化」進程的體現。本文綜合當時思想界對此問題所提出的各類解釋，將其畫分為兩大類，即「維護道德定命論」與「否定道德定命論」。分析論者之間的相互辯難，並指出「報施多爽」問題的爭論在中國思想史中的意義。

　　　　　Where there is a doctrine of the morally good to be blessed or rewarded, there is a conflict between theory and reality, for in reality it is not necessarily so. This problem, often called “the problem of evil” or of “theodicy” in Western tradition, is a universal one, but its existence in Chinese tradition has somehow been neglected by Max Weber and by later Sinologists. This article argues that this problem was not only present throughout Chinese intellectual history but also widely discussed among the educated elite particularly in the Han-Wei and Six Dynasties; and that such a problem, as a corollary of what Weber calls “rationalization,” was generated by the notion of moral determinism which can be found in Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese Buddhism. In this article, all solutions to that problem are categorized into two groups, namely, “moral deterministic answers” and “anti-moral deterministic answers.” Debate among the elite and the significance of the debate in Chinese intellectual history are also analyzed in this article.