許多民主轉型國家在民主化的過程中都衍生社會裂痕，呈現分裂社會的特徵。分裂社會的形成原因容有多端，呈現的方式也容有差異，但究竟憲法上政府體制的選擇與定位，尤其是憲政體制上設有贏者全拿的總統選舉，並賦予總統相當權限時，是否影響政治的分裂動員與社會的分裂，又如何影響，乃是新興民主國家憲政發展上的重要課題。在設有憲法法院的國家，面對總統所關連的社會分裂，又是如何面對，更是研究憲法解釋與法院與社會對話的重要課題。 台灣與南韓在民主化的發展有許多相似之處，固然引起注意，但兩者在過去民主轉型的脈絡中，在政府體制方面都偏向總統制的方向發展，且都有憲法法院對與總統有關的爭議做出許多憲法判決，在分裂社會的比較研究上，具有濃厚的學術價值。從本文的比較分析，可以看出相當令人驚訝的相似，但也有需多細膩的差異處。 本文發現兩個國家的憲政經驗顯示總統制贏者全拿的選舉制度、國會和總統的雙重民主、以及政黨的健全與否，都對分裂社會的衝突有重要的作用。相當於民主轉型初期，台灣與南韓在第一次政黨輪替期間，所產生與總統有關的社會分裂的憲法爭議最多，而且相對於一致政府時期，一旦發生分裂政府的情況，與總統有關的社會分裂憲法爭議也較高。在高度相似的情境之外，本文也分析其中值得注意的差異。憲法對政府體制規定的明確程度，以及歷史與社會脈絡上的差距，也造成這些憲法爭議案件分佈與議題取向的差異，充分顯示同樣在偏向總統制的政府體制下，不同的憲法規定密度或社會脈絡也可能會導致不同的衝突型態。儘管憲法法院經常被期待可以解決對立的衝突，本文也發現台灣與南韓的憲法法院大都採取尊重政治部門的方式，藉由議題的程序處理，讓政治部門有機會重新面對並處理這些爭議。

Many new democracies confronted social cleavages during the process of democratization, forming lasting divided societies. Causes and patterns of divisions are various in divided societies, but constitutional system, particularily the contentious presidential election and presidential power are engines of social mobilization and political conflicts. In the dymamics of social division, courts, particularily the constitutional court could play a critical role in reconciling or intensifying social devisions when the President is in the center of the political conflicts. The transitional experiences of Taiwan and South Korea are similar in many ways. They all developed toward Presidentialism during democratic transition, and the Constitutional Court all made several important decisions regarding to controversies triggered by the President. The comparative study and analysis of the constitutional adjudications in these two countries indicates that, although they share many common features, some important differences are worthy of inquiries. This article suggests that, Taiwan and Korean's experience indicates the winner-take-all presidential election system, dual democracy of President and the Congress, and contentious partisan politics are driving forces for social conflicts. Most controversies occurred during the period of first partisan turnover, the earlier stage of democratic transition. Also, in a divided government, political conflicts associated with the presidentcy were more often than in the period of united government. Despite of these commonalities, some differences are salient. A relatively ambiguious definition of presidential power is more prone to polical conflict than that of in South Korea. Although Constitutional Courts are expected to resolve conflicts, the article suggests that Constitutional Court in Taiwan and Korea tend to respect political branches, deal controversies with procedural dimension, leaving rooms for political branches to negotiation and compromise.